

1

Who has free will besides God?

Man.

But God and man have their respective free will in *different and metaphorical senses*.

The only way speaking of God's free will becomes more than a grotesque form of blasphemy is to know that becoming and realization in time, within the tension of time, which are essential to *will*, are alien and indeed *must* be alien to God's will. The use of the metaphor of will for God is only justified as a sort of trampoline kicked far behind, since though God is not anthropomorphic, man *is* theomorphic, in fact most clearly so in his spiritual organism and thus his will (Augustinus).

What is the meaning of man's free will?

Nothing more and nothing less than this, and completely exclusively this: that he has a will! A will not free is not a will.

A will that is not free is not a will, but a cramp, obstinacy, narrow-mindedness, inertia, a narcosis, an instinctive or reflex-like reaction to circumstances, in other words, it is anything but a free will.<sup>1</sup>

Free will, *will*: the action seen from its original, inner side.

What is a will?

The organization of bodily-sensual tensions and more generally of the lower, more intense tensions for well-defined aims, where these aims may be:

1. Generation or avoidance of bodily-sensual tensions (search for pleasure and avoidance of pain etc.)
2. The same with the round-trips of reason (utilitarianism and so-called economical action)
3. Spiritual aims of various orders and ranks;  
and the complex complications of the three.

There is no will without the intellectual function of setting an aim.

There is no will without the creative tension of the sensual and purposeful poles (search for pleasure, avoidance of pain, striving for increasing pleasure and diminishing pain – later we will need to return to the sensual and non-sensual emotions which do not easily fit into this classification: the so-called neutral sensations and feelings). The induction of a current between the sensual and the emotional aims is the minimum of will. When that is absent one can speak of desire, of fear, of intense fantasies, but not of will – even though in the passing irresponsibility of the act of naming we often call all these will.

The same seen from another angle!

There is no will without quiet contemplation<sup>2</sup>.

But quiet contemplation in turn is linked to will by the same bond. There is no quiet contemplation without will. Quiet contemplation is a pleonasm, an analytical judgment, or, if you will, a tautology; for who has ever lived a contemplation which was not quiet? Without willfully processing our instincts and bodily-psychogenic emotions, we can obviously not achieve that minimal quietude in lack of which the very function and concept of contemplation lose all their meaning.

*Contemplation and will supporting and meaning each other: this is action, realization seen from the inner side.*

Will is a relative magnitude and quality, just like everything else is relative compared to the One.

All will, all action rests on contemplation, on an *overview* articulated hierarchically and in perspective. Thus actions can extend only as far as contemplation, this hierarchical and perspectivist

<sup>1</sup> On un-free will as temper and arbitrariness, see Béla Tábor's "Introduction to the Prehistory of Reality" and "The Two Ways of Jewry".

<sup>2</sup> The Hungarian word is well approximated by the German "Anschauung"; it includes "viewing, approach" in its field of meaning. In this sense the verb form is similar to the Greek "theorein" and thus the noun "theoria", which beyond the clear connection to "theory" – as more recently Heidegger pointed it out – had the meaning theorein-horan: "to look at something attentively, to look it over, to view it closely".

overview can take them. Any impulse of motion or movement that aspires beyond this contemplation will come short of it. In the best case it will run on as an impulse of motion or movement<sup>3</sup>, unless – and theoretically this is more likely – it has gotten corrupted by the illegitimate intention.

Thus there is a direct proportionality between the breadth and depth of contemplation and the magnitude and significance of will and action.

That is why the active person, the person of acts will make every sacrifice to gain ever deeper and ever broader overviews of the *whole* again and again. An active person, a *healthy* person suffers of rhythmic waves of thirst for the whole<sup>4</sup>. In these rhythmic upsurges (think of a spiral), this free human will is striving for the whole; and if we now recall what we said of God's will in its non-blasphemous sense, then we realize that man's healthy, free will, which, as we tried to explain, is the *only one deserving* the simple name of will, coincides with satisfying the unremitting ancient demand of faith:

### ***Acquiescence in God's will***

In contrast the modern, atheistic man acquiesces “in the facts”, or tries at least to convince himself and us that he does so and that he is right to do so. He strains every nerve to forget that facts (the way he understands the word, i.e. with a clear intrinsic contradiction, namely as facts that never were facts, as in will and action<sup>5</sup>) are not there for us to acquiesce in them, but (to quote Marx freely) to change them.

## 2

This person, led by contemplation and by a will, venturing to act and learn to know, and therefore venturing with success will, in order to encourage, examine and educate both himself and his fellow men, coordinate his answers to Kant's and Pyrrhon's common questions as often as possible:

1. What can we know?
2. What can we do?
3. What can we expect?

He who really wants something, whose will is a will and whose action an action rather than a substitute for something entirely different, he who feels the vivid, resilient and growing desire for an embettering and ennobling *change* will seize all the help he can get, including even the criticism of his adversaries (if he does not, we can only conclude that this desire *is not* – neither is it resilient, nor growing, nor alive, nor does it exist at all) in order to answer these questions with increasing breadth, depth and harmony. For these constitute the inner contradictions and the comparison of these answers aimed at *eradicating* the inner contradictions is the only way to control ourselves. For who could control us without our own help? See also the need to educate the educators (again by Marx), which requires our own education, a fact that showed so fatal for Marx himself.

(If these were the broadest frameworks of our analysis of will and we were to proceed with a differential analysis, we would be the first to throw the stone at this procedure and attitude which clearly stem from an atomistic view. But that is not quite the state of the matter. This is but one out of three, or rather four, directions of analysis, the others being forcefully neglected due to constraints of presentation.)

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<sup>3</sup> The distinction between motion and movement is made in order to make it clear that the second form uses the word to move in its active, transitive sense “to move something”.

<sup>4</sup> Hungarian *egészség* = health, literally: wholeness (from *egész* = whole), similarly to English where the Old English “haelth” means “wholeness” – via the hale-hole-whole variants of pronunciation, ultimately meaning “intact, uninjured, whole”

<sup>5</sup> The word *fact* derives from the latin ‘factum’ = “a thing done or performed”, and thus is something willed and done.

The directions neglected from the analysis of will can perhaps be summarized as follows:

1. analyses carried out from the viewpoint of the national communities;
2. from the viewpoint of world history;
3. and from viewpoint of the reality of faith.

Even our analysis so far can only be considered valid with the modifications, simplifications and extensions introduced by these directions of analysis.

Ad “What can we know?”

One makes a situation analysis. The analysis is centered on the observing, willing individual in whose perspective all the realities of life polarize into the seething raw materials and the shaping methods of the analysis.

In the case of the questions “what can we do?” and “what can we expect?”, the impulse to censor out the central role of the analyzing person is already much weaker.

And here the question arises: at what point are we allowed to interrupt the analysis? Or the same in other words: is there a point at all at which we should stop the analysis?

Who carries out the analysis, supposing it is carried out indeed?

At what level do we carry out the analysis? The weight of this question is no less than deciding who first calls the child by name. (We do not mean modern Kretschmerian or similar characterologies for a specification of the level of the analyzing person, but the ancient tri-fold classification of individuals as hylic, psychic or pneumatic, which should naturally be differentiated further.)

This transcendental situation can be stated as a paradox:

At every moment, the current world situation *depends* on the level of the individual whose overall analysis can, with or without intent, just be assimilated by the national and the international media and public opinions.

### 3

According to a very widespread misunderstanding, everyone without exception has also the moral right to express his opinions concerning the relevance and importance of an event. Thus anyone also who rejects all responsibility of intellectual conscience by refusing to accept the necessity and the measure of a world view and and of faith.

What sense does it make to risk an opinion about the significance of an event, if I fail or refuse to risk an opinion about the Whole, about the World? Does the word significance have any meaning, any significance at all, if not within the Whole?

And if not, then is this very widespread misunderstanding anything but intellectual gangsterism toward all communities of thought and language?

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